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ADJUSTMENT ISSUES OF IMPACTED
COMMUNITIES OR, ARE BOOMTOWNS BAD?*
DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE and RALPH C. D'ARGE**
Considerable effort has been directed toward detailing the impacts
of large scale natural resource developments. Since the industrial
revolution, relatively rural and stable local economies have experi-
enced dramatic economic adjustments. However, recent attention has
focused primarily on the negative aspects of these adjustments, with
emphasis on socioeconomic ills of energy development in the Rocky
Mountain Region.
The hypothetical community of Pistol Shot, USA, was created by
Gilmore as a representation of the basic ills of an "impacted commu-
nity." Impacted communities encounter problems with providing
and maintaining an adequate infrastructure or general amenity levels
associated with a good called "quality of life."
The problems of impacted communities arise when a small, rural,
isolated community is adjacent to a large scale natural resource devel-
opment. The community does not know if it can handle the large
influx of new residents and fears that the outsiders with no cultural
or social ties to the community will overwhelm the existing commu-
nity facilities and its ability to provide services. The community fears
its overall stability will be altered dramatically by the rapid influx of
population.
An alternative scenario occurs when community leaders are enam-
ored with the potential growth of the community because of in-
creased real estate values and employment for their relatives and
friends. They perceive an opportunity for an increase in personal and
community wealth. Some citizens open restaurants, trailer courts,
and bars, while others provide a milieu of services. Most residents
gain-even the old widow who leases her house to the mine super-
*This study was funded by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New
Mexico. Initial portions of the study were completed through a grant from Resources for
the Future, Washington, D.C., to the University of Wyoming. The authors take sole and
personal responsibility for all views expressed herein.
**Respectively, Assistant Professor and John S. Bugas Distinguished Professor of Eco-
nomics, University of Wyoming.
1. For a discussion of the anatomy of an impacted community, see Gilmore, Boomtowns
May Hinder Energy Development, 191 SCI. 535 (February 1976). Infrastructure might be
represented by the service level per capita to residents provided by roads, schools, water and
sewer, etc.
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intendent and retires to Florida. Those moving into the community
receive higher wages and almost guaranteed employment. Some plan
to settle permanently in the community, while others may return to
their old communities or continue on to the next impacted commu-
nity.
At this time we do not know which scenario is more accurate, but
believe that some intermediate situation normally occurs where some
individuals benefit and others are harmed. This paper outlines one
approach for assessing whether communities always are harmed by
rapid energy development. In addition, a preliminary statistical an-
alysis is applied to test the hypothesis that an energy impact induces
higher crime rates. Our major conclusion is that secondary effects
(e.g., wildlife habitat reduction) from large population increases are
substantially greater than the direct effects (e.g., crime rate changes)
of rapid natural resource development.
AN ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT FOR IMPACTED COMMUNITIES
Economists have developed four distinct measures of economic
benefits associated with changes in the economy. These changes
range from technological advances, to the construction of water
resources development projects, to the evaluation of large scale ad-
justments in the type of energy use. The four measurements are: (1)
consumer surplus, which includes producer surplus; (2) national in-
come, as it relates to the production of goods and services; (3)
changes in social welfare, represented by a multidimensional list of
attributes such as local property values, inflation rates, and unem-
ployment rates; and (4) regional income changes. While these overlap
to some extent, they can be viewed separately. 2
The appropriate measure for economic benefits and costs is the
notion of consumer surplus. This, however, is not sufficient in itself
to properly frame the impacted community problem.
The boomtown literature specifically addresses the problem asso-
ciated with apparent and affected population levels during a boom
and the associated problems with lagging infrastructure. A more gen-
eral concept to Gilmore's approach would be to trace the impacts of
the development in a primary and secondary framework, including
the appropriate non-market impacts, and then identify the economic
2. A comparison and evaluation of the four approaches can be found in a report to Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory entitled, Identification and Assessment of the Economic
Benefits and Costs of Energy Development in the Rocky Mountain Region: A Preliminary
Analysis (May 1978).
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linkages of an impacted community. This perspective will be termed
the adjustment cost and benefit approach.
For Page, Arizona, data were collected for cyclical fluctuations of
the booms associated with the construction of the Glen Canyon Dam
and the Navajo Electric Power Generating Plant.' The analysis of
Page also detailed a set of possible scenarios for the proposed coal-
fired power plant in Kaiparowits. The study principally illustrated
the investment decision problem in relation to large population in-
creases.
Using econometric techniques, Cummings and Mehr attempted to
explain a wage difference in boomtowns in terms of a hypothetical
base community.4 The wage differential is hypothesized to be a
function of a differential in per capita infrastructure between a
boomtown and a base community.
In taking the perspective that non-market impacts must be con-
sidered, we are diverging from what might be considered the culmina-
tion of the Gilmore philosophy as represented by Cummings and
Schulze.5 They considered in a theoretical context the optimal in-
vestment questions relating to the infrastructure in a boomtown.
That is, can a set of criteria be set forth that lead to an optimal
investment level of infrastructure for the projected permanent popu-
lation level of a community. Their analysis assumes a world of per-
fect information, markets, etc. Thus, community preferences and
incentives are identical for all individuals. This analysis focuses only
on a single boomtown and thus considers the community invest-
ment decisions completely independently of the region or the nation.
Several themes contrary to this traditional boomtown viewpoint are
included in developing the adjustment cost and benefit approach:
1. It is important not only to consider the initial state of a boom
community, but the cyclical movement as well as the end result.
2. Amenities such as various types of social infrastructure can, of
course, be discussed in per capita terms but such an approach
obscures the role of public goods in a boomtown analysis. That
is, the sum of the parts (i.e., per capita measures) is different than
the whole (i.e., the general amenity level).
3. Considering the generally higher boomtown wages, an individual
is making a relocation decision based only on perceived individual
3. Ives, Schulze & Brookshire, Boomtown Impacts of Energy Development in the Lake
Powell Region, 28 LAKE POWELL RESEARCH BULL. (1976).
4. Cummings & Mehr, Investments for Urban Infrastructure in Boomtowns, 17 NAT.
RES. J. 223 (1977).
5. Cummings & Schulze, Optimal Investment Strategy for Boomtowns: A Theoretical
Analysis, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 374 (June 1978).
July 19801
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
utility, and not on the basis of impacts on other individuals
through changes in community productivity, public service, or
amenities.
4. Finally, given (1), (2), and (3), adjustments must be considered
not only within a community but among communities.
A. Full Cycle Viewpoint of a Boom town
In Figure 1, total amenity benefits are applied against time to help
illustrate (1). The time period from A to B represents the amenity
levels of a community before a large natural resource development.
From the onset of the project (B), there will be social losses that are
not imputed by formal markets. These adjustments can involve var-
ious types of externalities. Adjustment costs and benefits can be
defined as market and non-market costs and benefits incurred when a
Amenity
Benefits
FIGURE 1
Amenity Benefits Over Time
[Vol. 20
ARE BOOMTOWNS BAD
change in state is made.6 This would be represented by movement
from B to C and then to either D, E, or F. If levels of amenity
benefits D, E, or F represent new equilibrium levels in the impacted
community, it suggests that equilibrium amenity benefit levels for a
community could be higher than the initial one. The vertical dis-
tance, A to F, would be, in this case, positive. The actual adjustment
process clearly will incur costs which are due partly to the speed of
adjustment. Typically, however, costs have been viewed as occurring
only between but not inclusive in terms of analysis (i.e., ignoring
relative starting and ending equilibrium points) of points B and D or
E or F. Thus, to define the flow of costs and benefits from resource
developments an initial level, an adjustment period, and a final equi-
librium level must be considered.
B. An Example of the Adjustment Problem
For a simple example of the adjustment problem facing impacted
communities as set forth in (2) and (4) above, assume that changes in
per capita levels of real income and amenities create adjustment costs
and benefits.' Community 1 could be characterized as representing
the location of a natural resource development. Community 2 would
represent the source of labor required for the population influx to
Community 1. A wage differential between Community 1 and Com-
munity 2 is assumed to attract new workers. An adjustment process
begins between the two communities. In viewing this adjustment
process, the assumed goal is the most efficient use of the resources of
the communities. One possible set of impacts might be as follows. In
Community 1, the large influx of workers would increase per capita
real income of the community and possibly lower the availability of
amenities. Similarly, in Community 2, the population loss could in-
crease amenities and lower per capita real income. There are, of
course, other combinations of impacts.'
6. This definition is slightly more general than that used by other economists in recent
years. For example, in the adjustment cost literature adjustment costs are generally defined
as those increased costs due to the rate at which investment is undertaken and associated
with capital, an imperfectly variable resource, or a limited short-term substitute ability of
labor for capital in a production function. Gould, Adjustment Costs and the Theory of
Investment of the Firm, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 47 (1978); Lucas, Adjustment Costs and
the Theory of Supply, 75 J. POLITICAL ECON. 321 (1967); Rothschild, On the Costs of
Adjustment, 85 Q. J. ECON. 605 (1971).
7. Amenities and quality of life are assumed to be synonymous. Changes in amenities can
be represented by congestion levels, different qualities of education, police services, etc. We
implicitly assume that the family moves as a unit. This is not, however, necessarily true. A
worker might move and send money to support his family in a permanent location.
8. Amenities are assumed to be a public good with no per capita allocation being pos-
sible. That is, once provided, no one can be excluded from its use. This corresponds to the
type of public good specified by KARL-GORAN MALER, ENVIRONMENTAL ECO-
NOMICS: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY (1974).
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The dual problems resulting from population relocation of real
income changes and changes in the availability of amenities are as
follows. Let Yi, qi and Ni denote community real per capita income,
availability of amenities-public services, and population in Commu-
nity i. Each Community i is presumed to have a total real income
determined exclusively by initial population, or
Yi = Ki(Ni) (1)
where Ki is a type of production function with K' > 0, K" < 0,
where primes denote derivatives.' Equation (1) depicts the notion
that population levels (Ni) are directly related to the per capita real
income of a community. This is Gilmore's assertion." 0 The isolation
of labor as a contributing factor is a strong assumption. Wages di-
rectly support the community. Given that, little of the capital forma-
tion of a boom contributes to the community other than through
wages. For instance, the raw materials necessary for a coal mine devel-
opment are imported (i.e., machinery, etc.) and eventually the coal is
exported. The per capita real income of the community, even during
the boom, requires importation of purchasing power via the exporta-
tion of coal.1 1 As the population after the boom decreases, it is
anticipated that income per capita yi will decrease.
Next, let amenities-public services for the community be strictly a
function of population size, so that:
qi = hi(Ni) (2)
with h! :S 0 and h!' < 0. With Equation (2), it is proposed that the
amenities in a community are postulated to be inversely or directly
proportional to population size. For some communities, the initial
lack of an adequate tax base and the consequent increase in available
public goods resulting from a population increase augmenting the tax
base result in hi > 0.
9. In reality, output or per capita income is a function of skills of the labor force, etc. In
order to simplify the analysis, we have assumed a fixed relationship between all labor and
per capita income.
10. "The materials inputs-land, fencing, grass, water, cattle-were assembled, labor was
furnished by ranchers themselves or hired, and the classic factors of production-land, labor
and capital-were brought together. As a result, livestock was exported and purchasing
power was imported to support the local economy. This purchasing power largely supported
the entire population, including people and families whose income came from providing
consumer goods and services in the local services sector." Gilmore, supra note 1.
11. The case of Page, Arizona, supports this theme. See Ives, Schulze & Brookshire, supra
note 3. Coal is brought in from the Black Mesa mine and the power produced is exported to
Arizona and California.
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N
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FIGURE 2
Amenities/Population Relationship
Gilmore postulates the case of h! < 0. That is, each additional
individual who moves to the community diminishes the availability
of amenities for all individuals. Figure 2 depicts a relationship
between amenities and population for an initial level of infrastruc-
ture.' 2 For example, an increase of population from N! to N? for
Community i will increase amenities from q to q , while the con-
12. This relationship is considered to be non-linear. Assume miles of paved public streets
is the only unit of measurement for amenities. A linear relationship would imply that an
additional individual would require an additional mile or some constant fraction of a mile.
July 19801
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verse will be true for population movements to the right of N*.
Therefore, h 0 will occur depending on the existing and eventual
level of population and amenities and on the time rate of change in
population. Adjustment costs as well as benefits can occur through
changing amenity levels. Note that h' denotes the speed of adjust-
ment of amenity levels associated with population movements. Even
though there is not always a diminution of community amenities
(i.e., h' > 0), even an increase in amenities may entail second order
adjustment costs, as adjustment costs and benefits also may arise
from the speed of adjustment. The former is represented by h 0,
whereas the latter refers to the cost not represented in the market of
being out of equilibrium (hi' = 0). If amenity level adjustments to
new population levels were instantaneous, then h" = 0 would hold
and the community always would be at some optimum population
level.
Given this framework, consider four cases for two communities, a
and b. For a set of initial situations we examine the possible set of
directional changes in community amenities (h' < 0) as illustrated in
Figure 2. The flow of population between communities is assumed to
be from b to a. The rationale behind different initial situations is that
a community about to undergo a population change does not neces-
sarily have to be at N* or q* (the optimal amenity population level)
initially.
Consider communities ai and bi where superscript j denotes a
particular initial population level and subscript 1 denotes the case
under consideration. For communities to be located at ai and bi, an
improvement for both communities occurs from population shifts
from b to a, and both communities move toward q*, the maximum
amenity level.' 3 Recall, however, that some potential costs or bene-
fits of adjustment are incurred for any population movement. For
the case, ai and bi, both experience a loss in community amenities.
In case 3, Community ai experiences an improvement and b a
deterioration. Finally, case 4 is the reverse of case 3, and a4 experi-
ences a deterioration and bj an improvement. The point of these
four cases is that, while adjustment costs (h" < 0) will always be
experienced in terms of population movements, the final amenity
level is not necessarily determined strictly by the direction of a popu-
13. This potential move is one case considered by Pauly. See Pauly, Optimality, "Public"
Goods and Local Governments: A General Theoretical Analysis, 78 J. POLITICAL ECON.
572 (1970).
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lation flow. More residents do not automatically imply a negatively
"impacted" situation.
Consider the new high school built in Page, Arizona. Construction
began in 1973 and was completed in 1977. The old facilities were
considered temporary by the community, since it was thought the
population would remain at the post-Glen Canyon Dam construction
level. When the Navajo coal-fired generating plant was proposed, per-
manent school facilities were planned in anticipation of the popula-
tion influx.
From 1970 to 1974, the population of Page climbed from approx-
imately 1,500 to 8,200 and fell to 4,000 in 1976, which was the
projected permanent population level.I 4 Thus, during the planning
phases for the high school, the school population was increasing and
a situation of crowded classrooms existed. The construction workers,
however, moved out before the new high school was completed. The
planning process left Page with the following situation: the student
capacity of the new high school is 800 students and approximately
600 students are currently in attendance. The school was designed
for an average class size of 36, while currently there are about 22-25
students per class.' I From this information it would be reasonable
to argue that Page now has a permanent facility and thus amenity
benefits are greater by (h' > 0). The concept of costs of adjustment
for Page in response to changing population levels is represented by
h < 0 or the planning process.
C. Community versus Individual Preferences
The above discussion represented one stylized impact of popula-
tion flows. Why would the individual decide to move? What decision
criteria should be employed? What should the community offer to
induce the individual not to move, assuming that population changes
also affect real per capita income levels?' 6
The decision to move and the resulting impact involve two basic
viewpoints. First, there is the individual's perception of the relation-
14. Ives, Schulze & Brookshire, supra note 3.
15. Interview with Buel Bowlan, Superintendent of the Page, Arizona School District
(May 5, 1977). We do not intend in any way to reflect on Page, Arizona residents in a
negative manner. In fact, given the attractiveness of the community, they appear to have
dealt with impacts quite well. However, the high school seems to us to represent the idea of
costs of adjustments, h!' < 0, and the possibility of adjustment benefits, h' > 0. That is,
amenities increased but costs of adjustments were still incurred.
16. This is the hypothesis that perceived changes in real per capita income motivate
individuals to move. Community real income is defined as including wages, rents, interest
and profits.
July 1980]
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(Communities relationship)
(Individuals perceived
relationship)
(N2 - ) N2  NI
FIGURE 3
Relationship of Community Per Capita Income
to Population Movements
ship between the community per capita income, Yi, and the com-
munity's population, Ni . The individual may perceive the tradeoff to
be the linear relationship represented in Figure 3. That is, he assumes
his individual productivity at the margin for the community is no
different from any other individual and thus he does not confront
prices in terms of income or amenity effects. Second, the relation-
ship between community income and population from the commu-
nity's perspective, may be non-linear as represented in Figure 3.1 1
Assume that the per capita wage in Community i is Wi; then, if W, >
W2 , the individual will move. This impact is illustrated in Figure 3. If
the starting point is W.2 , the real income for the community is Y2.
The individual "perceives" the change to be (Y2 - Y2 ) which is less
then the real income impact to Community 2 (y2 - y*). Community
17. Important here is that in Cummings & Schulz, supra note 5, such a divergence is
impossible when perfect information is assumed.
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2 should be willing to bribe (i.e., reduced taxes) or offer the individ-
ual (N2 - 1) (Y2 - y*) to remain, as this represents their lost per
capita income at the margin. This partially illustrates externalities
problems, since other individuals might also demand such a bribe, and
then the question arises as to who should receive it. Community 1
has an income gain not shown in Figure 3 of (NI + 1) (y* - y, ).
Again, the Community 1 impact will be greater than the individual's
perceived impact. Given the nature of the assumed production rela-
tionship, the individual's perceptions do not coincide with actual
community impacts.
D. Placing the Adjustment Problem in a Multiple
Community Perspective
Adjustments must be considered from a regional perspective and
thus impacted communities can be classified into 16 possible com-
binations of K,, K,, h, and h2. Clearly, one polar case of adjust-
ment cost and benefit combinatios is K, = K2 = h, = 0, where per
capita income and total amenities are immune to labor movements.
Inequalities, however, bring us a "stagecoach" theory of adjustments.
This assumes a group of families continuously move from one large
resource development to another, creating and leaving disequilibrium
adjustments in infrastructure for various communities. The typical
case considered in the boomtown literature is K1 : 0, hl' * 0, and
h2 = 0, representing an emphasis on only one community.1 8 In terms
of adjustment costs and benefits, this case presumes that the boom-
town is an isolated case of economic disruption. Further, in the
typical case the individuals leaving Community 2 are thought to have
no impact at the margin on productivity, as assumed by K2 = 0. The
impact is confined to Community 1, as represented by K' * 0. The
population exodus has no impact on amenity levels in Community 2,
as represented by h2 = 0. The amenity and per capita impacts are
assumed to be confined to Community 1.
Implicit in our concept of the impacted community is the notion
that there are real and important primary and secondary non-market
impacts from natural resource developments. That is, one should not
judge amenity levels strictly from the perspective of the single com-
munity alone. A listing of secondary impacts might encompass such
items as impacts on regional recreation, aesthetics, and economic
changes in the state tax base, and possibly even natural energy
pricing. A principal problem in the impacted community research is
that most statements represent a set of hypotheses which remain
untested.
18. This case implies a situation of non-Pareto relevant externalities.
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AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF A PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY IMPACT
We challenge the popular conception of impacted communities.
For instance, a popular perception associated with a primary impact
is that serious crime, alcoholism, congestion, and pollution levels
show a dramatic increase when a large population influx occurs.1 9
A second thesis is that an isolated impact on a single community is
the sole problem, ignoring secondary effects of population influx on
wildlife habitat as an example. That is, if we solve social infrastruc-
ture problems we have solved the problem. To illustrate a counter
viewpoint empirically, a secondary non-market impact will be con-
sidered. Impacts on recreation opportunities as represented by wild-
life availability in Wyoming will be considered. 20
A. Primary Impact: Crime
One approach to examining the social impact hypothesis is to
identify western cities with relatively constant population growth
rates, but which have population levels similar to an impacted com-
munity. If we use a simple statistical test and it is found that the
crime rate for the boomtown does not differ significantly from the
stable communities, it suggests that the assertions that boomtown
impacts are always harmful are in doubt.2 1 The implication for cata-
loging benefits of a natural resource development is that there is no
cost, at least as far as crime is concerned, and thus net benefits for
the boomtown will be greater.
The data used in this comparison of crime rates for 36 western
cities was derived from two sources: (1) Current Population Reports,
Bureau of the Census, 1973 population and 1972 per capita income
estimates for counties and incorporated places; and (2) Uniform
Crime Reports for the United States, 1972.22 The year 1972 was
19. Manifestation of this viewpoint was well documented in the CBS News 60 Minutes
report on Rock Springs, Wyoming. It was implicitly suggested in the report that communi-
ties experiencing rapid population changes also experience a higher rate of crime. CBS News,
High Noon in Cheyenne, October 23 and 30, 1977.
20. While a variety of influences are possible from a large population influx, only poten-
tial decreases in wildlife availability from habitat loss will be considered.
21. An important point to this section is that we are attempting to present evidence that
suggests we cannot accept Gilmore's hypothesis that impacts are necessarily bad.
22. The authors are well aware of the skepticism with which this data set is viewed.
However, since this section considers a research design, but not results from which a policy
decision will be made, there is time in further work to obtain a superior data set. Of interest,
however, is that work with a superior data set has indirectly confirmed our conclusions.
Blank & Rowe, The Economics of Property Crime in Non-Urban Areas (manuscript); "Pop-
ulation Estimates and Projections," CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-25,
(Vol. 20
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chosen as the base year, which was the year that the present boom
period in Rock Springs, Wyoming was at its highest point.
The population of Rock Springs in 1970 was 11,657 and 14,284
in 1972. Comparison communities were chosen with populations
between 10,500 and 15,500, and with population growth rates from
1970 through 1973 of 10 percent or less.2 3
The 36 cities are listed in Table 1. Rock Springs has more than
doubled the population growth rate (22.5 percent) of any other city
in the sample for the years 1970 through 1973. Typically, the
growth rate of Rock Springs is four times that of each of the other
cities.
The statistics for the 36 cities suggest several conclusions. First,
note that the cities are listed in Table I in the order that the total
crime index (TCI) would suggest; that is, the city with the lowest
TCI is first. The TCI is derived by adding the number of crimes:
murder, robbery, etc. Not included in the TCI is the number of
larcenies of less than $50. A very rough ranking is thus established
according to this TCI, with the caveat that no differentiation is made
between, say, murder and auto theft. Thus, each statistic is assigned
equal weight. From the TCI we see that Rock Springs is 28th of the
36 cities with a score of 343. From Table 2, we see the mean TCI
score is 295, with a standard deviation (from Student's t-test sta-
tistic) of 193. Rock Springs is thus less than one standard deviation
from the mean, which suggests that there is no significant difference
in crime rate, as reflected in the TCI (from Table 1) of Rock Springs
with the other more stable communities.2
Table 3 records a statistical analysis of the "production" relation-
ship between various types of crime, population growth, and change
in income. Auto theft, petty and grand larceny, burglary, and murder
significantly (90 percent confidence level) increased as the popula-
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF CENSUS 1973; FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
FOR THE UNITED STATES (1972).
23. The communities chosen for the comparison were not merely a few randomly se-
lected communities but rather every community in the 13 Western States that had the
requisite population boundaries and also appeared in the Uniform Crime Reports. The latter
constraint only limited the sample size by two or three communities from all 13 Western
States, so virtually every city in the population group was included in the sample.
24. We see from Table 1 that two cities in the sample size had perhaps inordinately large
crime rates as roughly defined by the TCI: Pasco, Washington and Las Vegas, New Mexico
with 927 and 958, respectively. Given the possibility that these are unusual cases, these
values were eliminated in a second view of the data. The mean of this data set (see Table 2)
was 257 and the standard deviation was 113. Rock Springs is again within one standard
deviation of the mean, suggesting that there is no statistical difference between total crime
in Rock Springs and other cities of similar size.
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tion change increased. Alternatively, negligent manslaughter, rape,
robbery, and assault did not significantly increase. The change in
community income was accompanied by a significant increase in
murder and grand larceny.
What these results indicate is that the mix of crime is likely to
change when a community undergoes an energy boom. However, the
"mix" may be better or worse, depending on community percep-
tions. No one, to our knowledge, has been able to deduce how citi-
zens value (or disvalue) one type of crime versus another. Until such
preferences are revealed, there is no way, even subjectively, to assert
that energy impacted communities necessarily are worse off.
The reported crime statistics for Rock Springs as an energy im-
pacted community in 1972 were not significantly higher when com-
pared with relatively stable western communities of similar size and
per capita income. What can be concluded from these preliminary
experiments? Nothing, except that the "classical" description of
boomtowns is not statistically verifiable.
B. A Secondary Impact: Wildlife
An example of the secondary impacts associated with impacted
communities is the potential changes in wildlife population. We are
not arguing that primary effects are "small" in relation to "second-
ary" impacts. However, for the case of areas in Wyoming, we believe
that secondary impacts (e.g., on wildlife due to hunting, fishing, and
observation) will be important. This example focuses on the loss to
consumers associated with wildlife population reductions due to
energy related development plans in the eastern Powder River Basin
of Wyoming. The impact of energy development on wildlife has been
measured through its impact on the use of the wildlife resources in
producing hunting experiences. The estimated value of the wildlife
resource was developed by using a hedonic price equation, which is
based on the household production function approach to consumer
theory.2 s
In viewing the consumer surplus loss associated with wildlife popu-
lation reductions from coal development, links to population projec-
tions must be delineated. The counties in the eastern Powder River
Basin had a combined human population of about 107,000 in
25. Brookshire, Eubanks & Rowe, The Impact of Coal Development on Wildlife: An
Economic Analysis, in ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
5TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS
(1978).
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TABLE 4
Present Value of Consumer Surplus Loss*
Present Value Over 30 Years Present Value Oer 30 Years
Species % of Herd Lost 0% Discount Rate 8% Discount Rate 0% Discount Rate 8% Discount Rate
Deer 5% (850 Head) $3.600 $1,300 $5.900 $1,400
100% (16,800 Head) $37,800,000 $14,300,000 $63,300,000 $15,500,000
Antelope 9% (2,700 Head) $6,300 $2,400 $10,500 $2,500
100% (30,300 Head) $11,000,000 $4,200,000 $18,500,000 $4,500,000
Elk 100% (329 Head) $25,200 $9,500 $42,100 $10,300
*From Brookshire, Eubanks & Rowe, infra note 25.
1970.26 Projections to 1980 predict a population of 144,000, or
approximately a 25 percent increase in the region.' 7
The estimated population decline for deer in the region is esti-
mated to be from 16,800 animals to 15,950 animals, while the ante-
lope population was estimated to decline from 30,300 to 27,600.
The lone elk herd was estimated to have a baseline population of
320, and the predictions were that all 320 would be lost to the
region due to energy development. s
Table 4 presents the results. The estimated value of the consumer
loss resulting from a five percent decline in the deer population over a
30-year period is $3,600 at a zero discount rate and $1,300 at an
eight percent discount rate. Although these values may appear to be
very small, it must be remembered that the estimated decline is quite
small. If the entire deer population were lost to the region, $37
million would be the consumers' loss given the assumption of a zero
discount rate. 9
While the results cited above are only suggestive and tentative in
terms of magnitude, they indicate that a secondary impact (in this
case, recreational) from impacted communities may exist. This serves
to undermine further the orientation towards viewing the ills of an
impacted community as being only associated with a single commu-
nity.
CONCLUSIONS
Impacted communities are far from being proven as "inferior"
communities. In fact they may be nothing more than demonstrations
of the economic health of a society going through adjustments to
26. Campbell, Converse, Crook, Johnson, Natrona, Niobrara, Sheridan and Weston of
Wyoming.
27. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 1
DEVELOPMENT OF COAL RESOURCES IN THE EASTERN POWDER RIVER COAL
BASIN IN WYOMING (1974).
28. Id.
29. Alternative discount rates were chosen in that the loss to the region might be
assumed to be irreversible due to human population pressure.
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changes in energy needs and prices. What we suggest is that many
communities have gone through such adjustments in the past: whale
oil, peanuts, cattle, sugar beets, coal, gold, silver, uranium, and now
perhaps substantial increases in energy exportation. Why should the
federal or state governments subsidize energy impacted communi-
ties? Our preliminary results suggest that a firm economic basis does
not exist for such subsidies.
APPENDIX A
A Simplified Conceptualization of Adjustments
This appendix will formalize the concepts presented earlier. As
indicated previously, let yi, qi, and Ni denote per capita income
availability of amenities as public services, and population in location
or community i, respectively. A per capita utility function, ui(qi, yi)
that is twice differentiable and quasi-concave is assumed for each
community. It is assumed that total utility of all communities is
maximized. That is, per capita utility times community population is
a maximum across all communities. Given equations (1) and (2) and
from the standpoint of an optimal distribution of population among
communities, a LaGrangean equation can be formed and maximized:
m mL =  2; ui [hi(Ni), BiKi(Ni)]"- Ni + 77(N*  Z Ni)i=1 i=1
qi,Yi,Ni > 0
where 17 is a multiplier associated with fixed total population N*
such that Z Ni < N*. Taking the first order conditions of this expres-
sion, the following are obtained:
Ni[Uyi 0iKNi + Uqi hNi] + ui - 7 <0i= 1 . . M (A.1)
m
N*- Z Ni 1 0  (A.2)i=1
If per capita as opposed to total utility is maximized, the first
order condition (A. 1) changes to
u yiiKNi +uqi hNi - 7 < 0; i = 1,2, .... ,M (A.3)
The per capita first order condition indicates that marginal utility
adjusted for differences in marginal amenities and productivity is
equalized. If amenities and productivity are identical across commu-
nities, population ill be distributed equally, an intuitively appealing
result.
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Actual distributions of population may not conform to this opti-
mum in the sense that individuals donot consider prices as part of
their decision to relocate. Thus individuals do not consider either
income effects or amenities-public goods effects on others in relocat-
ing. In our opinion, this is the heart of the issue of "boomtowns"
and other consequences of rapid energy development.
In order to examine this model in more detail, explicit specifica-
tions of the utility and amenity-public services functions are postu-
lated. These are:
per capita utility ui = qiy i  (A.4)
total utility uiN i = qiYiNi (A.5)
amenities qi = ai/Ni (A.6)
production yi = iKi(Ni) (A.7)
population ZNi = N* (A.8)1
Let us assume there are only two communities and an autonomous
government agency with the ability to tax or subsidize for externali-
ties but with no regulatory powers to control population movements.
The optimum distribution of population, assuming total utility is
maximized, is given partially by the following necessary condition:
a, = 92 K2 (A.9)
a2 P, K'
That is, the ratio of marginal productivities of workers in augmenting
per capita production in the two communities must equal the recip-
rocal of the ratio of amenities coefficients. Different productivities
and amenities implies unequal per capita utilities. This result occurs
because the objective taken was to maximize the sum of total utility
for the two communities combined. More simply, with unequal in-
comes and amenities, the individual family will relocate if it pays for
them to do so. But without considering the impact of the families'
move on the community, shifts of population will occur until they
are distributed to equalize bads and goods that are privately obtain-
able. Such a process will lead to a distribution of population that
internalizes all private goods but does not adjust for the public exter-
nalities generated. In other words, someone will move if the income
change is high enough to compensate for the lack of amenities. What
this expression (A.9) reflects is a distribution which considers all
such repercussions. How will population distribute itself without gov-
ernment intervention? We propose that people with identical utility
July 19801
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functions, as is assumed in equation (A.4), will relocate until per
capita utility in the two communities is equal. Unless per capita
utility is equal, there will be an incentive for some (or all) of the
population of a community with lower per capita utility to relocate
in the community with higher per capita utility assuming zero reloca-
tion costs. In terms of the model outlined, equal per capita utility is
simply:
qly, = q2Y2  (A.10)
or, using equations (A.6) and (A.7):
a, = 2 )(N (A.11)
a2 f
Comparing (A.11) with (A.9) leads to the conclusion that only
under very special circumstances will population relocation achieve
the maximum utility for the two communities combined, i.e., a
Pareto optimum. As identified before, each individual is making a
relocation decision based only on perceived individual utility and
amenities and not on the basis of his/her impacts on others through
changes in community productivity, public services, or amenities.
Thus, without government intervention to act on the divergence be-
tween individual and community incentives, population will not be
allocated optimally.' 0
The autonomous government agency could tax or subsidize the
per capita incomes in each community so a Pareto optimum would
be achieved. Thus, the agency would establish a tax or subsidy for
one of the communities so the following conditions would hold:
N*=NI +N2  (A.08')
a13 K' = a2t32K (A.09')
a,31KIN 2 -t=a 202K2N, (A.I 1')
Such taxes, if levied in terms of utility, would provide incentives
in each community for relocation so Pareto optimality would be
achieved.3 1 The agency could use either taxes or subsidies. In general
30. This result has been demonstrated in so many other contexts in public finance
previously, so it probably does not have to be justified. However, perhaps we can re-
embellish it here by stating that perfect economic worlds cannot by definition generate
imperfect economic worlds. In consequence, if all individuals are fully aware of all contin-
gencies and can negotiate costlessly, the problems that we have formulated are both illogical
and tautological. See d'Arge, Introduction, Symposium on the Coase Proposition, 13 NAT.
RES. J. 557 (1974).
31. This result is analogous to the tax often found for optimally managing fisheries and
other common property resources in that the tax is partially based on the difference be-
tween average and marginal producitivity. See 0. HERFINDAHL & A. KNEESE, ECO-
NOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 161 (1974),
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the tax would not be zero, which implies the agency would have to
pay a net subsidy or receive a net tax from the two communities.32
And if the two communities negotiate a transfer of funds to try to
meet the same criteria of equal per capita utility, generally it will not
be possible to achieve an efficient allocation of total population
between them. This occurs because a net transfer of funds between
the communities is needed to adjust for externalities in production
and amenities between them.
Given that the government agency optimally has allocated popula-
tion through incentives, the next question is how these incentives
will change with autonomous shifts in per capita incomes, i.e., the
presence of bootmtowns. Let (A.08'), (A.09') and (A. 11') identify
the optimal initial distribution of population and taxes.
Next, let there be an autonomous shift in production in the first
community so j increases. Then by differentiating (A.08'), (A.09')
and (A. 1') with respect to j3, one obtains in matrix form:
aK -a2K2 0 dN* a2I 2K2-a1P1K
-1 0 dN_ 0 (A.12)
dgl
aiK'IN2--a 2 i 2 K2  alKI-a 2 2 K2N* -1 dt* -alKIN _
Solving for dt*/dg3, using Cramer's Rule the following expression
is obtained:
dt* I
S ([alK KIN2 + (a 1K-a 2 O2 K2N) (a2 g2 K2-al K)dfl (a I K-a2 K2)
(A. 13)
+ (a2 32 K -a 1 K' ) (a1 K 'N *-a 2 0 2 K2 ) - (a2 K")(aI K, N*)]
It is clear by assumption that both the denominator and the
numerator may be positive or negative, depending on the exact dif-
ferences in productivities and amenities. Thus, the characteristics of
each community impacted by energy development must be known
before an optimal subsidy or tax can be applied to the "boomtown"
32. Let a,=10, a2 =5, t3 =02=1, y,=10N,-N2 y2 =10N2 and N*=10. Then N*=2.5 andN*=7.5. The optimal per capita tax in utility terms is 25.5. That is, a per capita utility tax
on citizens in the first community of 25.5 would induce an optimum distribution of popula-
tion as regards productivity and amenities yet would retain equal per capita utility between
the communities. In per capita income terms this would amount to 6.375 or 34% of per
capita income.
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situation, even in the case of instantaneous population or investment
changes. When the complication of non-market adjustment costs and
benefits and their time rates of change are added along with many
communities and types of amenities, it appears difficult to conceive
of a practical method for accurately assessing all benefits and costs or
devising an optimal tax/subsidy.
